The Fast Dealing Oil Trading Game: Oilopoly  Russia’s Geostrategic Dominance of the Oil Market Vís-a-Vís the European Union by Jordon, Melissa Victoria
University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review 
Volume 23 Issue 1 Article 8 
12-1-2015 
The Fast Dealing Oil Trading Game: Oilopoly Russia’s Geostrategic 
Dominance of the Oil Market Vís-a-Vís the European Union 
Melissa Victoria Jordon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Melissa Victoria Jordon, The Fast Dealing Oil Trading Game: Oilopoly Russia’s Geostrategic Dominance of 
the Oil Market Vís-a-Vís the European Union, 23 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 257 (2015) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol23/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami International and Comparative 
Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more 
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu. 
THE FAST DEALING OIL TRADING GAME: OILOPOLY 
Russia’s geostrategic dominance of the oil market vís-a-vís the European 
Union 
 
Melissa Victoria Jordon 
 
INTRODUCTION..................................................................... 258 
I. GROUNDWORK ............................................................... 261 
A. RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS V. EUROPEAN UNION 
INSTITUTIONALISM ................................................... 261 
1. RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS........................................ 262 
a) RUSSIAN HISTORY......................................... 262 
b) RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY TODAY............... 265 
2. EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONALISM ............. 267 
a) GROWTH AND DIVISION................................268 
B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK..................................................274 
1. THE EU ON ENERGY............................................274 
2. THIRD ENERGY PACKAGE................................... 277 
3. THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY......................... 279 
4. RUSSIAN DOMESTIC LAW AND GAZPROM......... 281 
II. LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW........................................................... 284 
A. RUSSIAN-EU RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE ECT........284 
B. RUSSIA’S DIVIDE AND CONQUER STRATEGY: 
OPERATING UNDER BIT AGREEMENTS.................... 289 
C. USING OTHER INSTITUTIONS TO FURTHER RESPECTIVE 
RUSSIAN-EU POLICIES.............................................. 292 
1. THE EU SANCTIONS RUSSIA FOR ITS BEHAVIOR IN 
UKRAINE..............................................................292 
2. RUSSIA’S WTO CLAIM AGAINST THE EU...........294 
III. RACE TO THE PIPELINE....................................................296 
A. THE NORD STREAM PIPELINE, NABUCCO, AND SOUTH 
STREAM......................................................................296 
258 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
B. THE BATTLE OF SOUTH STREAM...............................301 
C. RUSSIA’S GAME CHANGING PLAY............................304 
D. RUSSIA’S OTHER PROJECT: ANTI-FRACKING............306 
E. LOOKING EAST.......................................................... 307 
IV. A FUTURE RUSSIAN MONOPOLY?...................................309 
A. WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE THE EU?.........................310 
B. IS RUSSIA AT A POINT OF STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS 
NOW?.........................................................................311 
C. THE CONTINUED RELATIONSHIP: NECESSARY 
INTERACTION UNDER THE ECT................................312 




Winter 2009—New Year’s Day—Russia cuts off the 
gas supply to Ukraine, like flipping off a light switch. Six 
days later, exports to sixteen European Union member states 
are affected.1 By day seven of the crisis, supplies have been 
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completely cut off to Europe and Slovakia has declared a 
state of emergency with dwindling gas reserves.2 Eastern 
European countries including Croatia, Slovenia, and Turkey 
struggle to keep their nations’ lights on.3 The crisis continues 
for thirteen more days until a resolution is reached by 
Ukraine signing expensive ten-year “supply and transit” 
contracts with Russia in order for gas supplies to resume 
into the Ukraine and European Union member states. The 
end result: Ukraine’s power will stay on until its next 
argument with Russia, and the match igniting the current 
European energy crisis between the European Union (the 
“EU”) and Russia has been lit. At the time of the cutoff, 
Russia controlled two-fifths of the EU’s total natural gas 
supply.4 As a result of this event, the EU realized that it 
needed to find alternative sources of natural gas supplies. 
This article explores the ensuing competition for gas market 
access in Europe between the European Union and Russia.  
The EU-Russian security dilemma is best understood 
as a quest for energy security. The fundamental differences 
between the EU approach and the Russian approach are the 
goals and strategies. Russia maintains geopolitical strategies 
in order to securitize its market while the European Union 
strives for energy independence through liberal 











3 Id.  
4 Id.  
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institutionalism. Russia utilizes international treaties and 
bilateral energy agreements for its own securitization 
practices, effectively weakening the EU’s control over its 
member states’ ability to contract under the Energy Charter 
Treaty (“ECT”). Considering the geopolitics behind Russia’s 
legal moves to secure the energy market across Europe, the 
EU’s only hope to avoid Russian dominance at this stage of 
the expanding petroleum industry is to secure the future of 
its own pipelines to offset member countries’ need for 
Russian pipelines. This article predicts that Russia and the 
EU will continue the battle for striking rich pipeline deals 
over the next decade as both attempt to check each other in 
the energy market through incompatible legal and political 
frameworks (the EU trying to institutionalize the energy 
market; Russia using geopolitics to manipulate EU 
institutions for its own gain), constantly undermining each 
entity’s ultimate quest for energy security.   
This note examines legal and extra-legal means 
deployed by both the EU and Russia towards achieving their 
respective goals. Part I of this note lays out the political and 
legal framework, focusing on EU-Russian energy conflicts, 
and explaining the relevant laws and treaties governing the 
energy sector. Part II considers Russia’s current relationship 
with the EU under the Energy Charter Treaty, current 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) with EU member 
states, and other relevant investment provisions. Part III 
explores the current, proposed, and future gas pipeline 
projects of both the EU and Russia. Lastly, Part IV considers 
the legal and political ramifications for the future of the 
European energy sector based on Russia’s mission to 
securitize the energy market and the European Union’s 
drive for gas independence. 
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I. GROUNDWORK 
 
A. RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS V. EUROPEAN UNION 
INSTITUTIONALISM  
 
Russian foreign policy in the energy sector is based on 
achieving geostrategic advantages.5 Conversely, the 
European Union’s approach focuses on using the 
institutional mechanisms such as the ECT rules and 
regulations to establish the energy market, setting a uniform 
method for contracting.6 Russia seeks to securitize using a 
Realist, geopolitical approach while the European Union 
continues to try and regulate the industry, bringing Russia 
into conformity with its market principles.7 These differing 
frameworks make it almost impossible to form any long 
term EU-Russian energy market agreement.  
 
                                                
	
	
5 In International Relations theory, Russia’s foreign policy approach 
would fall under the Realist paradigm, a theoretical framework used to 
explain changes in states’ behavior on the basis of geostrategic gains. 
Realist states see politics as a zero-sum game. There is a finite amount of 
power and a state gains security only at the expense of another state’s 
loss. This will be helpful in understanding the Russian strategy in the oil 
market.   
6 In International Relations theory, this approach falls under the liberal-
institutionalism paradigm, an alternative theory to realism, which posits 
the belief that international norms and institutions create cooperation 
among states. This approach best characterizes the European Union 
strategy in developing policy and resolving conflicts. The realist 
paradigm is incompatible with the very nature of the European Union 
because it denies the efficacy of extra-governmental bodies and 
international organizations in world politics.  
7 Henry Helén, The EU’s Energy Security Dilemma With Russia, 4 POLIS J. 2 
(2010). 
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1. RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS  
 
The territory that makes up the Russian Federation 
today extends across a vast amount of land, lacking easily 
defensible borders, and is home to several hostile ethnic 
populations that are often at odds with the centralized 
government.8 Russia’s unique place on the world map—
straddling both Europe and Asia—and its diverse ethnic 
enclaves, make Russian stability dependent on its ability to 
balance internal and external security. The quests for 
expansion and security throughout Russian and Soviet 
history can all be explained in terms of securitization 
practices.  
 
a) RUSSIAN HISTORY  
 
The Russian empire was formed after three eras of 
expansion to guarantee security through buffer zones, 
gaining land in the southeast to protect itself from the 
Mongols, expanding to the southern territories for access to 
the Caspian Sea, and lastly, conquering Ukraine and the 
Baltic territories to deter western threats.9 The Soviet Union 
then balanced these external security interests against a 
newly created internal threat: the disgruntled, conquered 
minorities. Balance was formed by the creation of a strong, 
                                                
	
	
8 Lauren Goodrich and Marc Lanthemann, The Past, Present and Future of 
Russian Energy Strategy, STRATFOR ENTERPRISES, LLC (Feb. 23, 2013), 
https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/past-present-and-future-russian-
energy-strategy [hereinafter “Russian Energy Strategy”]. 
9 George Friedman, The Geopolitics of Russia: Permanent Struggle, 
STRATFOR (Oct. 15, 2008), 
http://www.colorado.edu/geography/class_homepages/geog_4892_su
m10/Geopoliticsofrussia_stratfor.pdf. 
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centralized government in Moscow to bring all of the ethnic 
groups under one authority. The government then began 
militarizing and occupying the buffer zones to control the 
diverse internal neighborhood, better defend itself externally 
from other great power nation threats, and last but not least, 
utilize its natural resources as a leverage point against other 
great powers.10  
The use of natural resources (mainly oil exports) as a 
leveraging tool has constituted a large part of Russia’s past 
and present geopolitical practices.11  Since the 1800s, energy 
has been a vital commodity for Russia’s geostrategic goals.12 
During the Soviet era, energy exports accounted for half of 
the government’s export revenue.13 This allowed the 
government to fund its expensive militarization practices 
and subsidize the high cost of transit for food to its internal 
population, while also subsidizing gas prices to the eastern 
block that made up buffer zones to keep the conquered 
territories at bay.14 Meanwhile, Russia’s ultimate 
geostrategic goal was to secure its western border and ocean 
access because Russia lacked warm water ports, like the 
other great power nations, that could be used to combat its 
economic shortcomings for transit in a land-based empire.15 
                                                
	
	
10 Id.  
11 Russian Energy Strategy, supra note 8.  
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
14 Id.   
15 Due to Russia’s northern land-based territory, the Russian empire and 
Soviet Union struggled to provide food to its entire populous. First, the 
growing season was extremely short as the “breadbaskets” are at the 
latitude equivalence of Maine in the U.S. Second, the vast territory is 
lightly settled and the farmlands were great distances from urban centers 
and cities, thus making timely transport problematic, especially in the 
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Russia’s failure to secure timely access to the ocean and 
external borders, while continuing to divert all of its internal 
resources towards the government’s arms race, subsidizing 
agriculture and the price of oil tanking, all led to the collapse 
of the Soviet Union.16 The government could maintain the 
high costs of its internal security only if it continued to 
receive the high revenues relied on from exporting oil to the 
West.17  
As the Soviet Union began falling behind the West in 
technology and resources, the oil market that the Soviet 
Union heavily relied on to fund its expensive state 
operations collapsed after the 1970s energy crisis, decreasing 
demand for the Soviet Union’s oil.18 By the mid-1980s, the 
Soviet Union tried to raise energy prices in the Baltic region 
to recover some of the lost revenue and reform its market—
but it was too little, too late.19 The Union fell and the Russian 
territory contracted, retreating from its western borders and 
central Asia in order to re-focus its resources to regain 
internal security and live to fight another day. That day 
came a decade later with Vladimir Putin’s presidency in 
2000.20 The energy market was first on Putin’s list to reform 
by reconsolidating the energy sector under state control after 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
winter. Third, the cost of the transport made the food unaffordable. For 
more information, see generally Friedman, supra note 9, at 6. 
16 Id. at 10-11; Russian Energy Strategy, supra note 8.  
17 Russian Energy Strategy, supra note 8. The Soviet Union was able to sell 
its oil at 50% lower cost than the Middle East due to keeping labor costs 
low. This gave the USSR power over its periphery while undercutting 
the West. Problems would soon follow with inefficient oil production, 
and the fluctuation in the market.  
18 Id.    
19 Id.  
20 Id.  
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two decades of market liberalization.21 As a result, the 
energy sector became effectively nationalized and energy 
strategy, still used for securitization practices, became 
Putin’s most useful foreign policy tool.  
 
b) RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY TODAY  
 
The Russian government underwent a series of 
restructuring in the two-and-a-half decades following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, but the securitization practices 
never changed, only the audience. Under the Putin regime, 
the only modification of the strategy was to become more 
aggressive in utilizing its natural resources as a leveraging 
tool against the East and West, to not only threaten powerful 
countries such as the United States, Western European 
countries, and China, but also to reestablish stability in its 
periphery.22 To achieve this, Putin’s government 
consolidated the oil and gas industries into three monster, 
state-owned companies: Gazprom, Rosneft, and Transneft.23 
Once Russia’s gas industry was secured, the Kremlin24 began 
                                                
	
	
21 Id. The period immediately preceding the collapse of the Union under 
the Gorbachev government, into the 1990s reign of Yeltsin, underwent a 
series of energy liberalization attempts to create a market-based 
economy. The energy market became even less efficient, as oligarchs 
bought up the former state owned oil industries, leading to corruption 
and fragmentation.   
22 Id.  
23 To learn more about how the Putin regime was able to swiftly and 
efficiently consolidate the privatized oil industries, see KHODORKOVSKY, 
http://www.khodorkovsky.com (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). It provides an 
explanation of the breakup of YUKOS, the largest oil company in Russia 
owned by billionaire Khordokovsky in 2003 due to alleged “tax fraud.”  
24 “Kremlin” is a term used in place of the Russian government/former 
Soviet government.  
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aggressively negotiating supply contracts containing large 
quantities at sky rocketed prices with the former Soviet 
states and European countries (distinct from the EU) simply 
because Russia was in the position to do so as the only 
supplier.25 The 2009 crisis with Ukraine is illustrative of this 
approach.  
Putin’s revised energy strategy has provided Russia 
with excess funds to pump into its political, military, and 
economic sectors26 just as before; but high reward comes 
with high risk. Over half of the Russian government’s 
budget now comes from the energy sector (more than during 
the Soviet era); thus, Russian stability remains tied to the 
success of the gas industry.27 Putin, acutely aware of this, 
has tried to shift Russian revenue-raising ventures away 
from the energy market to decrease its dependency on its oil 
market, but with little success. Ten years of relying on the 
Gazprom monopoly has left Russia with lagging technology 
                                                
	
	
25 See Russian Energy Strategy, supra note 8; see also THE FUTURE OF 
NATURAL GAS, AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY 147-58 (2010), available 
at http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/NaturalGas_Report.pdf. The 
structure of Europe’s natural gas market was shaped by the OPEC 
embargo of 1973. Europe tied the price of natural gas to the price of 
crude oil, which limited development of a deep and liquid spot natural 
gas market. As a result, “this dependence places a high premium on 
security of supply, which is reflected in the region’s dependence on long-
term, relatively high-priced contracts indexed to oil.” The need for the 
long-term contracts was to secure supply and accommodate for 
fluctuating energy prices but oil is an imperfect index for natural gas. 
The relationship between Oil and Gas will be discussed in detail in Part 
III.  
26 A specific example is from the early 2000s when Russia paid off its 
hefty debt and added billions of dollars to a rainy-day “stabilization 
fund.”  
27 See Russian Energy Strategy, supra note 8.  
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(reminiscent of Soviet problems) and has made it unfriendly 
toward outside investment.28 This economic vulnerability 
has affected Russia’s foreign policy behavior—using energy 
as a political tool—toward regional and international actors, 
such as the European Union.29  
Putin’s resulting foreign policy—while aimed at 
restoring Russia to its previous glory based on territorial 
boundaries that guarantee Russian security—seeks to use 
the international institutions in place to achieve its own 
ends: securing revenue from the European energy market, 
encouraging bilateral treaties and agreements over EU 
negotiated deals, and helping establish the rules of the game 
in those deals contracted with EU institutions. Russia seeks 
to “divide” Europe to “rule” the energy market and be 
accepted by the international community as an effective pole 
in a postmodern, multipolar world.30 This strategy plays into 
Russia’s divide-and-conquer strategy, its role in 
international organizations such as the WTO, and its 
provisional agreement under the ECT, explained further 
below. Russia’s end-goals are to use these institutions to 
pursue its own unilateral interests in positioning itself to 
help set the rules for these institutions.31  
 
2. EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONALISM  
 
The eventual formation of the European Union was a 
response to the Realist geopolitics that governed countries’ 
                                                
	
	
28 Id.   
29 Id.   
30 See Andrei P. Tsygankov, Preserving Influence in a Changing World, 58 
PROBLEMS OF POST COMMUNISM 28, 36 (2011). 
31 Id.  
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past aggressions across Europe after two world wars. The 
European Economic Community (EEC), founded in 1958, 
was originally established to create interdependence among 
European nations after WWII with the aim of avoiding 
future conflicts.32 The hope was that countries that traded 
together would stay together. Since its creation, the EEC 
expanded both its members and policy areas, warranting a 
name change in 1993 to become the European Union, an 
intergovernmental economic and political partnership that 
today consists of 28 partner countries.33 From the EEC’s 
conception to its transformation into the large institutional 
body called the EU, an institutionalist approach to energy 
securitization practices has dominated, which entails 
diversification of the energy markets to attain flexibility and 
independence.  
 
a) GROWTH AND DIVISION 
 
The European Union, starting from just six member 
states, expanded to over four times its original size. After 
WWII and during the ensuing Cold War between the Soviet 
Union and the United States, the former EEC began to 
expand to include more Western European member states: 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark in the 1970s; 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal in the 80s; and Austria, Finland, 
                                                
	
	
32 See generally About the EU, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). The original founders in 
1958 for the European Economic Community were Belgium, Germany, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.  
33 See The EU in Brief, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-
information/about/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).  
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and Sweden in the 90s.34 After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the arms race, the EU consisted of 15 members 
and conducted its largest acceptance and expansion of 
membership in 2004 to include more Eastern European 
countries such as Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia.35 Part of the motivation behind the large expansion 
was to instill democracy and bring more of the former Soviet 
states into the peaceful, civilized European Union that is 
committed to democratic ideas and fair market trade 
principles. The Union members in favor of expansion saw 
this as an opportunity to help the newly established 
democracies and countries that had undergone democratic 
revolutions to solidify their commitment to democracy 
through incentives to join the Union and become part of a 
trade and political organization that would help their 
nascent market economies and democratic political 
structures.36  
Expansion continued in 2007 to include Romania and 
Bulgaria.37 In 2013, Croatia became the newest member.38 
Both the 2004 and 2007 candidates had to undergo a series of 
internal transformations of their government structures, 
policies, and laws so as to align themselves with the Union 
                                                
	
	
34 See Countries, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014) 
35 Id.  
36 See Enlargment, EUROPA.EU, 
http://europa.eu/pol/enlarg/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).   
37 Countries, supra note 34.  
38 Enlargment, supra note 36.  
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prior to accession.39 The concern with accepting the newer 
members from Eastern Europe is twofold: (1) fear of 
deviating from the original political goals of the Western 
European members, and (2) wealthier members like 
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom bearing the 
brunt of the costs to revitalize the new members’ 
underdeveloped economies. 
Turkey and Ukraine also play roles in changing the 
composition of the EU, specifically in terms of the discussion 
below. Turkey filed an application for membership in 1987 
and was declared an official candidate in 1997.40 While 
negotiations began in 2005, Turkey has yet to accept the 
additional protocol41 and negotiations cannot continue until 
it agrees to do so. The story with Ukraine is different. 
Ukraine is part of the EU’s neighborhood policy and thus 
cooperates with the EU. An application has not been 
accepted and Ukraine is not a candidate at this time, but the 
EU’s goal is to continue to bring Ukraine closer to the EU 
through support packages and assistance to aid the 
                                                
	
	
39 European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-
country-information/turkey/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).  
40 See, e.g., Arguments For And Against EU Enlargement, DEBATING EUROPE, 
http://www.debatingeurope.eu/focus/infobox-arguments-for-and-
against-eu-enlargement/#.Vk6SP9bZrdt 
41 For more information on the additional protocol, see Additional Protocol 
and Financial Protocol signed on November 23, 1970, annexed to the 
Agreement establishing the Association between the European Economic 
Community and Turkey and on measures to be taken for their entry into force-
Final Act- Declarations/* Unofficial translation*/, 293 OFFICIAL J. L. 4 (Dec. 
29, 1972), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:21970A1123(01). 
2015 OILOPOLY 271 
economy, human rights, and civil society.42 The EU has not 
experienced many limitations in implementing uniform 
policies and expanding its areas of interest with the larger 
group of members. Despite the EU’s ability to efficiently 
expand its economic, monetary, and social welfare programs 
in the Union, divisions between old member states with 
newer eastern members, and each state’s separate political 
and economic agenda, create impediments for a unified EU 
front on other issues that affect several members of the 
Union. This is especially true in the energy sector.  
The EU members create European policies and 
initiatives and implement them in their state to increase ease 
of travel, trade, and welfare among states. “Rule setting is 
particularly important to the EU because it lacks many other 
sources of traditional power” as a supranational 
organization.43 Members of the European Union are bound 
by legislation from both their national parliaments and the 
EU institutions. The European Union has a “single 
institutional framework” consisting of seven sub-organs that 
function like a state government.44 Three of these sub-organs 
                                                
	
	
42 For more information on the neighborhood policy and partnership 
with Ukraine, see European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement 
Netogiations, supra note 39.  
43 See Helén, supra note 7, at 9 (quoting Laffan, The European Union Polity: 
A Union of Regulative, Normative and Cognitive Pillars, 8 J. OF EUR. PUB. 
POL’Y 709, 711 (2001)).  
44 Under Article 13 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
European Union, the seven sub-organs are: (1) the European Parliament; 
(2) the European Council; (3) the Council of Ministers; (4) the European 
Commission; (5) the Court of Justice of the European Union; (6) the 
European Central Bank; and (7) the Court of Auditors. See Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on the European Union, art. 13, October 26, 2012, 
55 O.J. 13, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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(the European Council, the European Parliament, and the 
European Commission) together have power and influence 
over the EU’s policy and law making.45 The European 
Council (EC) consists of the heads of state from each country 
and provides for the political direction of the Union as the 
essential EU decision maker, negotiating and adopting new 
EU legislation.46 The EC does not have the power to exercise 
legislative functions.47 The European Parliament (EP) 
consists of 751 representatives selected by countries that are 
democratically elected to represent blocs of European 
citizens.48 The European Commission (Commission), with 28 
members (one from each member state), is the main 
institution in the EU that has the power to draft proposals 
for new European laws, take care of day-to-day business, 
and implement policies.49 The Commission, in conjunction 
with the Court of Justice of the EU, enforces policies and has 
power to place restrictions, fines, and take legal action 
against members in violation of EU laws.50   
Legislative acts are formed by “ordinary legislative 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:TOC#text [hereinafter “EU 
Treaty”]. 
45 EU Institutions in Brief, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/index_en.htm#goto_1 (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).  
46 See generally, Counsel of the European Union, EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/ (last Dec. 14, 
2014).  
47 Id.  
48 See European Parliament, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/european-parliament/index_en.htm (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2014). 
49 See European Commission, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/european-commission/index_en.htm (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2014).  
50 Id.  
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procedure” as defined by the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, which consists of joint adoption by the 
Parliament and the Council of proposals initiated by the 
Commission.51 There are four types of laws that govern EU 
policies: regulations, directives, decisions, and 
recommendations.52 Any regulation passed by the EU sub-
organs has general application and is binding on all member 
states, any directive is binding on the members it is 
addressed to but leaves the national authority the right to 
choose how to implement such directive, a decision is 
binding in its entirety, or if the decision is directed at certain 
member states, it is binding only on those parties, and 
recommendations are not binding at all.53 Member states are 
required to adopt any national laws to allow implementation 
of Union acts and when the laws conflict, if the Union was 
within its competency to create such a law, policy, treaty, 
etc., it is binding on the state.54 
                                                
	
	
51 EU Treaty, supra note 44, at art. 16(1); EU Law, EUROPEAN UNION, 
http://europa.eu/eu-law/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).  
52 EU Law, supra note 51.   
53 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, art. 288, Oct. 26, 2012, 55 O.J. 47 available at, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2012.326.01.0001.01.ENG 
[hereafter “EU Function Treaty”].  
54 For an example, see Case C-6/90 and C-9/90, Andrea Francovich and 
Daniela Bonifaci and Others v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. I-5403. This 
case involved an EC directive that would have given the claimants 
guaranteed payments due to the insolvency of their employer, but Italy 
had not yet implemented the directive in a timely fashion. The European 
Court of Justice held that a directive is still binding on a state even if they 
have not adopted implementing measures required by the directive. Italy 
was thus held liable for the violation as a breach of community law and 
required to provide compensation for the loss suffered by citizens of the 
community.  
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B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The development of Russia’s modern energy market 
and the formation of an economically interdependent union, 
the EU, has led to an inevitable clash of laws, ethics, and 
political frameworks. Below are the laws and regulations 
that govern the EU and Russia respectively in the energy 
market. These laws and regulations that govern Russia, the 
EU, and the Russian-EU relationship have often been formed 
in response to actions of the other. Additionally, the rules 
and laws set up by Russia, the EU, and other institutions are 
further manipulated to achieve their own ends of 
dominating the energy market, as illustrated in Part II. 
 
1. THE EU ON ENERGY 
 
The European Union and its EEC predecessor were 
always concerned with establishing uniform energy security 
and technology across Europe. The EU commitment to 
energy technology and resources is evident through its 
multiple appearances in the Treaties of the European Union. 
Article 3(1)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, states 
that the Union shall have exclusive competence for 
establishing the “competition rules necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market,” and have exclusive 
competence55 over a common commercial policy under 
                                                
	
	
55 The dichotomy between complete/exclusive or shared competence is 
the power with which the EU law or regulation has over individual 
member states. Complete, or exclusive competence and regulations 
means that they have been established by a unanimity of members in the 
Council of Ministers, that any law or regulation in that area supersedes 
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Article (3)(1)(e).56 This Article implicitly gives the EU 
competence to set the rules governing the energy market 
within the Union and Article 4 explicitly puts energy within 
the competence of the Union. Article 4(2)(i) gives the Union 
“shared competence” over energy, even if it is not expressly 
granted or referenced in Articles 3 and 6 of the treaty.57 
Despite these multiple attempts by the EU to create 
exclusive competence over the energy market, member 
states have been unwilling to give up their national 
competence over their domestic oil and gas markets in the 
energy sector. 
In theory, because the EU is an institution governed 
by the rule of law (treaties) and has established either 
exclusive competence or shared competence over certain 
energy issues (through the articles mentioned above), it 
should not be difficult to regulate and secure its energy 
market. In practice, the venture is much harder to achieve as 
the EU has failed to effectively control the energy market 
and secure energy supplies for its member states. The crucial 
problem limiting the EU’s ability to unify the energy market 
and complete contracts lies in its inability to act as a unified 
body towards the energy market. Such shortcomings can be 
found in the conflicting distribution of competencies within 
its own treaties, articles, and member states’ insistence on 
controlling their own energy policies. On the one hand, in 
the Chapter on Energy from the EU Function Treaty, Article 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
conflicting national laws. Shared competence means that both the EU 
body and member states have competence over the area. In order for any 
law or regulation to be binding on the individual countries, a unanimous 
vote of the Council of Ministers, comprised of the relevant minister in 
each member state, agrees to be bound by that regulation. 
56 EU Function Treaty, supra note 53, at art. (3)(1)(e). 
57 Id. at art. 4.  
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194(1) and the beginning of Article 194(2) give the EU the 
power to pass laws and create policy concerning its energy 
market goals:  
 
Article 194. 
1. In the context of the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market and 
with regard for the need to preserve and 
improve the environment, Union policy on 
energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity 
between Member States, to:  
(a)  ensure the functioning of the energy 
market;  
(b)  ensure security of energy supply in 
the Union;  
(c)  promote energy efficiency and 
energy saving and the development of new 
and renewable forms of energy; and  
(d) promote the interconnection of 
energy networks.  
2. Without prejudice to the application 
of other provisions of the Treaties, the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, shall establish the measures 
necessary to achieve the objectives in 
paragraph 1. Such measures shall be adopted 
after consultation of the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the 
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Regions.58 
 
On the other hand, if one reads further in Article 
194(2), paragraph 2 contains a significant reservation:  
 
Such measures shall not affect a Member 
State’s right to determine the conditions for 
exploiting its energy resources, its choice 
between different energy sources and the 
general structure of its energy supply, without 
prejudice to Article 192(2)(c).59 
 
This large reservation undermines the ability of the 
EU to act as a unified body, giving the individual member 
states the right to maintain sovereignty over their energy 
sources and supplies. To remedy this shortcoming, 
especially in terms of the threat of a Russian oil monopoly, 
the EU sought to further regulate the energy market as much 
as it could, creating an energy policy agreeable to all 
members to protect all energy endeavors in the Union 
through the Third Energy Package and Energy Charter 
Treaty. 
 
2. THIRD ENERGY PACKAGE  
 
The EU’s attempt to securitize its gas supply to each 
of its member states came in response to the disunion among 
members, the repeat incidents with Ukraine and Russia, and 
                                                
	
	
58 Id. at art. 194 (emphasis added). Article 194(1)(c) will become 
important for the discussion of newer energy sources (i.e. shale gas and 
fracking).  
59 Id. (emphasis added).  
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the inability to guarantee its own EU gas supplies. The EU’s 
Third Energy Package came into force on March 3, 2011, 
containing two directives and three regulations aimed at 
unifying the EU energy market.60 The main components of 
the package are concerned with unbundling the energy 
market to create a single energy supply market. This means 
separating the “operation of gas pipelines and electricity 
networks from the business of providing gas or generating 
power.”61 The Package also created the European Network 
of Transmission System Operators for Gas or Electricity 
(ENTSO) to facilitate cooperation among different national 
energy system operators.62 A last major component is the 
creation of Pan-European Network Codes and ten-year 
plans to develop these networks.63 The hope was to have 
electricity grids and gas pipelines linked among nations by 
2014 to allow for the cheap circulation of power.64 
The EU interdependence structure has created an 
institutional setting to regulate the relationship among 
states’ activities, but can rely only on soft power to 
implement any energy policy. In addition, not only does the 
institutionalization occur internally, the EU effectively 
“projects onto its relations with other states the type of 
interstate relations that its own members have succeeded in 
                                                
	
	
60 Third Energy Package, NATIONALGRID.COM, 
http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industry-
information/Europe/Third-energy-package/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). 
61 EU Moves Towards ‘Single Energy Market,’ RTE.IE (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.rte.ie/news/2011/0303/298313-eu/. 
62 Third Energy Package, supra note 60.  
63 Id.  
64 EU Moves Towards ‘Single Energy Market, supra note 61. 
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setting up with one another.”65 This external projection of 
EU institutionalism can be seen from the EU’s attempted 
partnership with Russia in the Energy Charter Treaty.  
 
3. THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY  
 
The Energy Charter Treaty was created after the end 
of the Cold War as an attempt to provide a framework for 
international cooperation under the Energy Charter 
declaration of December 1991.66 In 1994, the ECT and the 
Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental 
Aspects (PEEREA) were created to provide a binding 
multilateral treaty aimed at leveling the playing field in 
energy-related investment and trade.67 By December 1994, 
The ECT and PEEREA were ready for signature. The ECT 
and PEEREA entered into force in April 1998, after the first 
thirty members ratified the treaty.68 To date, sixty-two states, 
including EURATOM members, have signed the ECT.69 
Russia was one of the 1994 signatories, but it never ratified 
                                                
	
	
65 Helén, supra note 7, at 9 (quoting Dominique Finon & Catherine 
Locatelli, Russian and European Gas Interdependence: Could Contractual 
Trade Channel Geopolitics?, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 423, 426 (2008)). 
66 See generally ENERGY CHARTER, 
http://www.energycharter.org/process/overview/ (last visited Jan. 9, 
2015).  
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 ‘Updated’ Energy Charter Frequently Asked Questions, ENCHARTER.ORG 
(Sep. 12, 2014), 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:GPpRBw-
1808J:www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/UEC_FA
Q.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.   
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the treaty.70 In 2009, Russia announced its statement of intent 
not to ratify the ECT.71 
Article 2 of the ECT explains the purpose of the 
Treaty as, “establish[ing] a legal framework in order to 
promote long-term co-operation in the energy field, based 
on complementarities and mutual benefits, in accordance 
with the objectives and principles of the Charter.”72 The idea 
behind the ECT was to liberalize the energy market by 
creating a multilateral investment treaty as opposed to 
traditional bilateral investment treaties, discussed in further 
detail below. The Treaty further makes clear that states 
retain sovereignty over their energy resources, as Article 
18(1) states that “[t]he Contracting Parties recognize state 
sovereignty and sovereign rights over energy resources. 
They reaffirm that these must be exercised in accordance 
with and subject to the rules of international law.”73 This 
provision guarantees protection from expropriation and 
other prejudices a foreign investor may face with a less 
reliable trading partner by holding them accountable in 
arbitral proceedings if such a situation occurs. Parties to the 
charter become bound to provide protections to these 
foreign investors to help promote trade with countries. 
Despite Russia’s intent not to ratify the ECT, as an initial 
signatory, Russia is bound to protect an investor who is a 
national of a party to the treaty until 2029 under Article 
                                                
	
	
70 Anatole Boute, The Protection of Russian Investments in the EU Energy 
Market: A Case in Support of Russia’s Ratification of the Energy Charter 
Treaty, 29 ICSID REV. 525, 526 (2014). 
71 Id. at 526.   
72 Energy Charter Treaty, pmbl, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95. 
73 Id. at art. 18(1).  
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45(3)(b) of the ECT.74 Therefore, any claims by foreign 
investors can be brought under the ECT against Russia until 
2029, but Russia does not have the same privilege. This is 
important to note for the discussion below.   
 
4. RUSSIAN DOMESTIC LAW AND GAZPROM 
 
The EU’s initial energy policies in the early 2000s 
failed to control the energy market across Europe, vis-à-vis 
its member states, giving Russia, with its centralized energy 
policy, an enormous advantage in the short term. With 
Putin’s rise to the presidency in 2000, came the re-
consolidation of the energy sector under the Russian 
government’s control. It was all part of the “Putin 
Doctrine”—Putin’s commitment to reviving the economic, 
political, and geostrategic position of the former Soviet 
Union.75 In order to recover the economic component, the 
Kremlin steadily accrued state sway over the oil and gas 
industry starting with Gazprom. Gazprom is a majority-state 
                                                
	
	
74 Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 72, at art. 45(3)(b). Article 45(3)(a) 
states in relevant part that “any signatory may terminate its provision 
application of this Treaty by written notification to the Depository of its 
intention not to become a Contracting Party to the Treaty,” however, 
under article 45(3)(b) “[i]n the event that a signatory terminates 
provisional application under paragraph (a)… any Investments made in 
its Area during such provisional application by Investors of other 
signatories shall nevertheless remain in effect with respect to those 
Investments for twenty years following the effective date of 
termination.” Because Russia has not ratified the ECT, it is not entitled to 
these same protections.  
75 For more information on the Putin Doctrine, see Leon Aron, The Putin 
Doctrine, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar. 8, 2013), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2013-03-
08/putin-doctrine 
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owned global energy company that was created in 1993, 
pursuant to the Russian Government Resolution and 
Presidential Decree as a Russian Joint Stock Company.76 It 
was subsequently reorganized to become an open joint stock 
corporation; however, the government maintains a 
controlling majority of the company to coordinate its 
activities with the Kremlin’s policies and goals.77 Gazprom 
currently holds between 72-78% of the national output and a 
monopoly over the pipelines and exports from Russia.78  
The Russian state then pursued its monopoly to also 
include over half of the oil industry by expanding the 
majority state-owned Rosneft, Russia’s now leading 
petroleum industry, by “expropriating” Russia’s former 
largest privately owned oil company, YUKOS, in 2004.79 The 
Russian government brought tax fraud charges against 
YUKOS, bankrupting the corporation to break it apart and 
then put it up for auction by the Government so that Rosneft 
could acquire the main assets. Putin then appointed former 
KGB officer Igor Sechin as head of the corporation.80 Despite 
                                                
	
	
76 GAZPROM, http://www.gazprom.com (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).  
77 Paolo Sorbello & Ludovico Grandi, From Concentration to Competition: 
The Struggle for Power Between The Kremlin and Gazprom Through The Study 
of TNK-BP and South Stream, 25 IRISH SLAVONIC STUD., 106, 109 (2013). 
78 See The Political Economy of Russian Oil and Gas, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 
INSTITUTE (May 29, 2013), http://www.aei.org/publication/the-political-
economy-of-russian-oil-and-gas/; see also GAZPROM, supra note 76.  
79 The Political Economy of Russian Oil and Gas, supra note 78. 
80 Id. The Russian government achieved a monopoly through bringing 
false tax fraud charges against Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former 
Russian businessman, oligarch, and owner of YUKOS. Khodorkovsky 
was one of the wealthiest men in Russia and his company was attacked 
under false auspices in order to bankrupt and break up the corporation 
and offer the assets up for auction sales at cheap prices. After a series of 
government actions to cover up the sale, including putting the core 
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Russia’s signature on the ECT, a treaty that was designed to 
prevent such expropriations, an arbitral award was not 
considered or rendered until 2014—years after Russia had 
successfully absorbed the former YUKOS into its own state 
companies.81 This demonstrated the EU’s inability to 
effectively control the energy market through 2014 and 
Russia’s willingness to breach the ECT in favor of pursuing 
its own short-term goals, which may have major 
repercussions later.82 After 2004, Rosneft continued to 
prosper and in 2012 it acquired a 100% stake in TNK-BP, 
officially making it the largest publicly traded oil company 
in the world by output.83 Russia’s majority state-owned oil 
pipeline company, Transneft, led by another former KGB 
officer, Nikolay Tokarev, completes the Kremlin’s energy 
trifecta.84 As a result, the Russian energy companies 
(Gazprom, Rosneft, and Transneft), are de facto state 
controlled companies that are concerned with reasserting 
Putin’s power-vertical state through using energy resources 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
assets of YUKOS under a front name in a local province, Rosneft was 
able to make the purchase inconspicuously. For more information on the 
expropriation of YUKOS and trial of Khodorkovsky, see KHODORKOVSKY, 
supra note 23. 
81 To see highlights and details of the arbitral decisions see Martin 
Dietrich Brauch, Yukos v. Russia: Issues and Legal Reasoning Behind US $50 
billion awards, IISD (Sept. 4, 2014), 
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2014/09/04/yukos-v-russia-issues-and-legal-
reasoning-behind-us50-billion-awards/. 
82 The 2014 arbitral award was unfavorable to Russia, ruled to owe tens 
of billions of dollars to the original YUKOS investors that were injured 
from the expropriation of YUKOS.  
83 History of Rosneft, ROSNEFT, http://www.rosneft.com/about/history/ 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2015).  
84 Transneft, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/transneft/ 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2015).  
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as a political tool against the EU and Russia’s near abroad.  
 
II. LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 
 
The Russian-EU relationship is best understood 
through the concept of energy security: security of a stable 
oil market (demand) for Russia and security of direct access 
to oil lines (supply) to the European community.85 The 
current interdependent relationship has made interaction 
mandatory, but cooperation optional. The relevant laws and 
regulations that govern Russia, the EU, and the Russian-EU 
relationship have often been in response to the actions of the 
other. Russia and the EU have a choice: to work together in 
the energy market (unlikely based on their differing 
motives), or to seek a competitive advantage. If the latter 
strategy is adopted, one of two outcomes will likely prevail: 
Russia’s monopolization of the gas market or the EU’s 
reliable access to non-Russian markets.  
 
A. RUSSIAN-EU RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE ECT 
 
The ECT is an example of the EU’s attempt to create a 
rule of law in the energy market through the provision of 
legally binding protection for foreign investors. Under the 
Realist paradigm, the ECT is viewed by Russia as a treaty to 
secure Europe’s energy supply at the expense of Russian 
                                                
	
	
85 Silvia Caneva, EU-Russia Energy Relations: lack of Unity in the Union, 
EU-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.e-
ir.info/2011/03/07/eu-russia-energy-relations-lack-of-unity-in-the-
union/. 
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market security.86 Russia’s subsequent geostrategic planning 
for its initial signature on the ECT, and later intent not to 
ratify the treaty based on its Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs) with European nations, illustrates the different 
foundations on which the EU-Russian energy relationship is 
based. 
BITs are bilateral agreements between two countries 
that provide the terms and conditions upon which 
investments can be made. These agreements grant protection 
for investments from expropriation and unfair prejudice or 
bias based on nationality. This is usually done through a 
specified form of dispute resolution, either by the 
International Convention for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) or in accordance with the rules and 
procedures of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).87 Many of the BITs 
signed between Russia and other EU member states were 
initiated while Russia was still legally the Soviet Union, 
resulting in a lot of narrow dispute resolution clauses since 
the policies of the Soviet Union were not as concerned with 
foreign investor rights, as a primarily nationalized economy 
with few direct foreign investments.88 The expropriation of 
YUKOS is a prime example of the way Russia manipulated 
its legal obligations through individual BITs to gain 
complete influence and control over the oil and gas 
industries in Russia.89   
                                                
	
	
86 For a more detailed explanation, see generally Boute, supra note 70, at 
526.  
87 For a basic understanding of international arbitration and international 
dispute resolution mechanisms, see generally JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF 
ARBITRATION (Oxford University Press, 2014).  
88 Boute, supra note 70, at 530-31.  
89 KHODORKOVKSY, supra note 23.  
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Today, Russia needs EU investments to modernize its 
natural gas extraction technology and secure its markets, 
and the EU needs Russian gas reserves to supply its power. 
The interdependent trade relationship between Russia and 
the EU is best shown in terms of imports and exports, 
illustrated in Figure 1.1 below. Attracting foreign 
investments became necessary for Russia to fund its energy 
market and the ECT provided a special dispute resolution 
clause for energy investments that would encourage 
investment. In 2008, more than 75% of the foreign direct 
investment Russia received—particularly in the energy 
sector—came from the EU.90 Conversely, the EU relied on, 
and still relies on, large quantities of energy from third party 
states.91 For these reasons, the EU used the ECT to try to 
bring Russia in line with its market principles and 
institutionalize its relationship with a major gas provider. 
Russia would benefit from foreign investment with its 
strategic markets in the EU, mainly Germany, France, Italy, 










                                                
	
	
90 Miroslav Jovanovic, EU-Russia Energy Relations: the Role of International 
Law from Energy Investment and Transit Perspective, 65 INSTITUT EUROPEEN 
DE L'UNIVERSITÉ DE GENÈVE 1, 62 (2011).  
91 Id. at 63.  




(The above chart indicates trade between the EU and Russia from 2013. 
The EU imports 77.7% of its S3 category: mineral fuels, lubricants, and 
related materials from Russia. This category is inclusive of oil and gas. 
Conversely, the EU exports 47.4%, almost 50% of its machinery and 
transport equipment (as indicated in category S7) which includes oil 
and gas extraction technologies, pipeline equipment, and other 
transport mechanisms for these types of natural resources.)92  
 
As an initial signatory to the ECT, Russia has 
provisional membership for 20 years after its statement of 
intent not to ratify (until 2029).93 Provisional membership in 
                                                
	
	
92 European Union, Trade in Goods with Russia, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
(Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113440
.pdf. 
93 Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 73, at art. 45(3).  
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the ECT means that Russia is bound to apply investment 
promotion and protection, as well as dispute settlement of 
the ECT for investments within its territory from the period 
of provisional application until the expiration of the 20 years 
in 2029.94 This would encourage investors from within the 
EU to invest in Russia’s gas market, knowing that any 
investments they make in Russia from now until 2029 will be 
protected. However, this protection does not extend to 
investments made by Russian companies or nationals after 
2009 in any of the EU nations. Why then would Russia have 
signed the treaty in the first place? The answer is twofold. 
 First, it is possible that many of the investments 
Russia sought to protect in the EU through its gas 
conglomerate, Gazprom, were made prior to the 2009 cut off 
date and formed part of a geostrategic move on the part of 
Russia. While Russia is bound to protect European member 
state investments for the 20-year period under the charter, 
after these EU upstream resources95 and companies have 
entered Russia and the protection expires, Russia will have 
all the technology and resources it needs again. Then Russia, 
                                                
	
	
94 Boute, supra note 70, at 534.  
95 Upstream and downstream resources are business terms, regularly 
used in the oil and gas industries. Upstream resources, in terms of the 
petroleum industry, refer to locating the underwater oil reserves, 
bringing oil and gas to the surface, and even processing of the raw 
materials. Downstream resources, in the context of the petroleum 
industry, refer to the processing of the materials collected from 
extraction, i.e. oil refineries, and selling the oil and gas products to 
individuals, governments, or other businesses. The entity responsible for 
downstream processing has direct contact with customers, providing the 
finished product. For more information, see Brian Bass, The Definitions of 
“Upstream” and “Downstream” in the Production Process, CHRON, 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/definitions-upstream-downstream-
production-process-30971.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).  
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returning to liability only under the narrow BITs, will feel 
free to expropriate some of the businesses as part of its 
energy securitization strategy. Second, the refusal to ratify 
could stem from the Treaty’s Transit Protocol, which would 
have required Russia to agree to the principles of freedom 
and transit “without distinction of the origin, destination, or 
ownership of energy, and non-discriminatory pricing.”96 
This would go against the nature of Russia’s securitization 
strategy and practices as it would force Gazprom to give up 
its physical monopoly of supply when delivering gas to 
Europe and severely undercut Russia’s main revenue-raising 
venture.  
 
B. RUSSIA’S DIVIDE AND CONQUER STRATEGY: OPERATING 
UNDER BIT AGREEMENTS  
 
Russia, conscious of the EU shortcomings on 
enforceability of unified energy legislation, has taken 
advantage of this weakness in the institutionalism approach 
(the inability to fully control individual states on a 
supranational level) by further fragmenting the Union 
through its refusal to cooperate under the ECT and its own 
bilateral energy agreements with the major energy providers 
and innovators of the EU member states. While the EU seeks 
to institutionalize its relationships, individual member states 
within the Union still maintain Realist goals to secure their 
own energy resources, markets, and wealth like Russia. This 
has made it easy for Russia to contract with individual 
member states to secure separate, private gas deals on 
                                                
	
	
96 Helén, supra note 7, at 10 (quoting AALTO & WESTPHAL, THE EU-
RUSSIAN ENERGY DIALOGUE: EUROPE’S FUTURE ENERGY SECURITY 11 
(2008)).  
290 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
Russian terms without unbundling, while creating 
incentives for those member states to block a unified energy 
market in the EU so as to keep their nation’s monopoly on 
gas distribution. 
Russia has established “special partners” in the EU 
through private gas contracts to undercut the EU’s ability to 
create an internal market. These special partners include 
France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.97 The energy companies 
in these countries enjoy separate deals with Russia that favor 
their own national energy companies, such as Germany’s 
E.On Ruhrgas, France’s Gaz de France, and Italy’s ENI over 
a unified energy market.98 For example, in 2005, Germany 
and Russia signed a deal to create a pipeline, Nord Stream, 
from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea.99 Despite Russia’s 
loose BITs with members of the EU, such as Germany, the 
individual countries are still willing to contract in exchange 
for lucrative gas deals with terms that would economically 
favor their domestic energy companies and markets.100 This 
will be discussed further below, but for the purposes of the 
divide-and-rule strategy, the pipeline ends in Germany, 
making Germany a major hub of distribution of gas for the 
rest of Europe, giving it power of distribution over the other 
                                                
	
	
97 Helén, supra note 7, at 13.  
98 Caneva, supra note 85. 
99 See Nord Stream Gas Pipeline (NSGP), Russia-Germany, HYDROCARBONS-
TECHNOLOGY.COM http://www.hydrocarbons-
technology.com/projects/negp/ 
100 See TILMAN DRALLE, A GLANCE INTO THE FUTURE: THE PROSPECTIVE 
INVESTMENT LAW REGIME BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 23 (2013), available at https://tu-
dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/fakultaeten/juristische_fakultaet/jfoeffl9/g
lobaltransaxion/veroeffentlichungen/DreRePIEL_paper_0213. 
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states.101 These individual gas deals provide Russia with 
powerful agents in the EU (the states contracting with 
Russia) to hamper the successful formation of a unified 
energy policy that would restrict Russia’s ability to deliver 
gas at high prices and maintain its monopoly over gas 
supplies to the EU.  
 Not only have these partnerships undermined the 
creation of an internal, unified gas market, they have also 
hampered the EU’s ability to form an external energy policy 
with the individual states signing bilateral deals with 
Gazprom for future energy supplies. Aware of the Russian 
strategy, especially after the 2009 Ukraine crisis, the EP and 
EC passed a 2010 regulation to safeguard against future gas 
cut offs, combating Russia’s attempt at dividing the 
members by furthering the institutionalization of energy 
supply.102 Regulation No. 994/2010 provides a Preventative 
Action Plan and Emergency Plan to ensure that the 2009 
Ukraine gas dispute does not repeat itself. Under the 
regulation, there must be multiple exits for gas distribution 
to other EU members and certain amounts of gas must 
always be kept in oil reserves in a member state that is part 
of the transit and distribution of gas.103 It further calls for 
increased cooperation among certain member states in 
Annex IV to ensure collective security of gas supplies.104 It is 
no surprise that Germany, one of Russia’s greatest advocates 
against a unified energy policy, is listed in groups needing 
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102 See generally Council Regulation 994/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 295) 1 (EU) 
[hereinafter “Gas Supply Regulation”], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
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more intra-EU cooperation and transparency.105  
 
C. USING OTHER INSTITUTIONS TO FURTHER RESPECTIVE 
RUSSIAN-EU POLICIES 
 
In addition to the legislative and contractual activities 
of the EU and Russia respectively in the energy market, 
Russia and the EU have further polarized their relationship 
through retaliations against each entity’s disagreeable 
behavior. While the EU continues to use institutions and 
rules to combat Russia’s aggressive behavior toward 
establishing a gas monopoly in Europe, Russia has begun 
using institutions against the EU. The ability of Russia and 
the EU to negotiate future energy market conditions and 
regulations has continued to diminish through each side’s 
attempts to gain strategic advantages over the other before 
continuing gas negotiations. 
 
1. THE EU SANCTIONS RUSSIA FOR ITS BEHAVIOR IN 
UKRAINE 
 
When Russia announced its annexation of Crimea in 
March of 2014, the EU attempted to use its institutional rules 
against Russia to demonstrate the EU’s ability to control its 
own member states and trade market. The EU refused to 
recognize the annexation and placed sanctions against 
Russian-turned-Crimean officials in addition to restrictive 
trade conditions already in place under the Council 
                                                
	
	
105 Id. at Annex IV - Regional Cooperation. Germany is listed in three 
relationships that need improvement: (1) Germany and Poland; (2) 
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg; and (3) 
Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
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Regulation of July 31, 2014.106 The EU restriction on the sale 
of goods to Russia under Article 3(1) of the July Regulation 
required prior authorization for the “sale, supply, transfer or 
export, directly or indirectly of technologies as listed in 
Annex II, whether or not originating in the Union, to any 
natural or legal person, entity, or body in Russia or in any 
other country if such equipment or technology is for use in 
Russia.”107 Annex II listed, specifically, line pipe drilling or 
production platforms, oil and gas extraction tools and 
machinery, making clear that EU sanctions were not targeted 
only at Russia’s aggressive behavior in the Ukraine, but also 
at combatting Russia’s potential to expand gas projects in the 
newly annexed part of Ukraine. 
If Article 3(1) did not give the impression that the EU 
was targeting Russia’s oil and gas industry, Article 3(5) did 
so by stating:  
 
The competent authorities shall not grant any 
authorization for any sale, supply, transfer or 
export of the technologies included in Annex 
II, if they have reasonable grounds to 
determine that the sale, supply, transfer or 
export of the technologies is for projects 
pertaining to deep water oil exploration and 
production, Arctic oil exploration and 
                                                
	
	
106 Erik de Bie and Sanne Mulder, New EU Sanctions Target Crimea and 
Sevestopol, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 29, 2014), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-eu-sanctions-target-
crimea-and-sevastopol. 
107 Council Regulation 833/2014, art. 3(1), 2014 O.J. (L 229) 1, 3 (EU), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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production, or shale oil projects in Russia.108  
 
The EU sanctions would effectively cripple Russia’s 
economy, which is dependent upon the upstream resources, 
previously indicated in Figure 1.1, to produce its oil and gas 
products. While the EU has been weakening Russia’s market 
access, including bank and loan access, it is clear the EU is 
still dependent upon Russian gas and oil supplies as it did 
not limit Russia’s gas exports. Such action would have 
completely crippled Russia, whose largest gas export market 
is the EU.109 The sanctions target Russia’s oil firms Rosneft, 
Transneft, and Gazprom by limiting access to EU energy 
markets, but the fact that the gas industry remains excluded 
from sanctions demonstrates the EU’s inability to completely 
sever ties with Russia. The sanctions fail to do two things: (1) 
exercise control over its energy market, as it still relies on 
Russian gas exports, and (2) make negotiations of 
subsequent gas agreements amicable.  
 
2. RUSSIA’S WTO CLAIM AGAINST THE EU  
 
In response to the EU’s Third Energy Package that 
would not allow Gazprom to have more than a 50% stake in 
any energy contracts signed in EU member states, Russia 
sought to utilize other international institutions for its own 
agenda, using the EU’s institutionalism approach against it. 
On April 30, 2014, Russia filed a request with the World 
Trade Organization against the EU’s Third Energy 
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Package.110 In its request, Russia alleged that EU 
regulations—specifically, the Third Energy Package 
provisions—were “inconsistent with a number of obligations 
and specific commitments of the EU and its Member States 
under the WTO Agreement.”111 Russia alleged that most of 
the unbundling procedures of the Energy Package 
constituted violations of the EU’s agreement under the 
WTO, specifically, the inconsistent application of 
unbundling procedures and the certification requirements 
that place higher burdens on third parties and foreign 
investors.112  
Russia’s interest in settling the matter stemmed from 
the proposed South Stream Pipeline that Russia and EU 
members had begun working on, and will be examined 
further in Part III. Because the Third Energy Package limits 
Russia’s ability to own and operate a pipeline, the regulation 
would mandate that “50 percent of the pipeline can be 
operated by Russia’s Gazprom, but the other 50 percent 
must be operated by a third party, a condition Russian 
energy ministers do not accept” as the Russian State’s Gas 
conglomerate, Gazprom, is the only company with the legal 
right to export gas from Russia.113 This would mean Russia 
giving up complete control of its pipeline, destroying the 
potential for an independent Russian gas monopoly in 
Europe, and undermining Russia’s profit incentive.  
                                                
	
	
110 See Russia files dispute against EU over regulations in the energy sector, 
WTO.ORG (Apr. 30, 2014), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/ds476rfc_30apr14_e.h
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113 Russia sues EU over ‘Third Energy Package’- report, RT.COM (Apr. 30, 
2014), http://rt.com/business/156028-russia-sues-eu-energy/.  
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III. RACE TO THE PIPELINE 
 
The EU’s recent laws and regulations (the Third 
Energy Package and sanctions) have weakened Russia’s 
ability to completely dominate the EU’s energy market 
through the government-driven Gazprom. Russia’s divide-
and-conquer strategy has been successfully deployed to 
undercut any EU plans for gas liberalization and 
independence. Both the EU and Russian attempts to control 
the energy market are best illustrated through the pipelines 
that have been proposed, implemented, and cancelled. The 
proposed pipelines are discussed below in terms of the 
respective strategies and circumstances surrounding the 
success or failure of the projects, Russia’s 30-year gas deal 
with China, and EU versus Russian plans moving forward.  
 
A. THE NORD STREAM PIPELINE, NABUCCO, AND SOUTH 
STREAM  
 
The 2005 contract between Germany and Russia to 
create the Nord Stream pipeline allowed Russia to not only 
reignite a special relationship with Germany, but was also a 
strategic legal agreement for Russia to begin securing its 
energy market. The Nord Stream pipeline was the first direct 
pipeline from Russia to the EU, bypassing other transit 
countries.114 It directly linked Russia and Germany, 
commercially and politically.115 Initially, the pipeline was 
                                                
	
	
114 For a complete history and background of the planning and 
construction see NORD STREAM, https://www.nord-stream.com/the-
project/pipeline/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).  
115 It was strategically beneficial for Germany to serve as the major hub 
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viewed as increasing EU’s security of supply. The EU later 
realized, after the Ukraine crisis, that this also meant an 
increase in gas dependence from an untrustworthy partner: 
Russia.116 This led the EU to solidify plans for an alternative 
gas market and pipeline, the Nabucco pipeline. In response 
to the EU’s Nabucco plan, and after successfully contracting 
with Germany to construct the Nord Stream Pipeline, Russia 
also launched a South Stream project between Gazprom and 
the Italian ENI Company (a mixed corporation) to be 
completed by 2015.117 South Stream would require a large 
amount of financial backing from the energy companies and 
governments, but would send gas directly to Europe, 
bypassing Russia’s troublesome neighbor, Ukraine, by 
routing the pipeline under the Black Sea to Bulgaria, where 









																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
EU dependence on its gas supply. Further, a political alliance between 
Germany and Russia emerged from Germany’s desire to keep its 
favorable pipeline contract, which brought Germany on board with 
Russia’s desire to limit EU unification of a single energy market.  
116 Caneva, supra note 85. 
117 Id.  
118 Id. The author argues that the agreements showed a tendency of the 
EU countries to sign bilateral deals with Russia in line with their national 
interests, regardless of the collective security concerns as members of the 
EU. 





(This map indicates the four main European-Russian pipelines 
discussed in this article: The Nord Stream Pipeline (established), 
South Stream pipeline (scrapped as of December 2, 2014), the Nabucco 
pipeline (scrapped in the summer of 2014), and the proposed Blue 
Stream pipeline (Russian pipeline project with Turkey). Pipelines not 
included in this chart are an alternative EU pipeline and the Power of 
Siberia pipeline that would feed from Russia to China.)119   
 
The South Stream pipeline would further increase EU 
dependency on Russian gas exports as Russia gained 
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bilateral agreements with the partially government-owned 
Italian energy company and struck a huge deal with 
Bulgaria and Greece to begin the project in 2012.120 The 
South Stream project was designed to block any 
independent EU pipeline, such as the Nabucco pipeline that 
the EU had been planning for nearly a decade. South Stream 
and Nabucco had similar planned pathways, as illustrated in 
Figure 1.2 above. Despite the EU impression that the high 
costs of building South Stream would make the project 
highly improbable, it became clear to the EU that Russia was 
willing to do anything to keep the government-controlled 
Gazprom from having any competition, including 
Nabucco.121  
Russia’s second step in its divide-and-rule strategy 
targeted Nabucco. The pipeline would further divert some 
of Russia’s gas supply percentage to the EU. The Nabucco 
pipeline became a reality in 2004, under the Austrian OMV 
company, after being included in the EU Trans-European 
Energy Network Program and receiving a 2003 EU Project 
                                                
	
	
120 Parties to the intergovernmental agreements for South Stream 
between 2008-2011 included the following: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Greece, Hungary, Serbia, and Slovenia. In addition, Gazprom sealed six 
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Stream, GAZPROM, 
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Collapses, CARNEGIE EUR. (July 1, 2013), 
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grant to provide half of the funding.122 The pipeline’s 
construction was planned in two parts: the first part was 
initially scheduled to be completed in 2012 (later postponed 
to 2015) to deliver gas from pipelines established in Turkey 
to Austria, after an intergovernmental agreement was signed 
between Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey 
in 2009. The second part was scheduled for completion in 
2013 (postponed to 2019), to bridge the first part of the 
pipeline in Turkey to Iran and Georgia.123 Russia’s second 
step in securing its energy market was realized through 
Russia’s state gas conglomerate, Gazprom, gaining control 
over the companies that the EU sought to use as its own 
transit network. First, Gazprom signed a memorandum of 
understanding in 2006 with the Hungarian company, MOL 
(a transit state in the Nabucco pipeline), to build a rival 
pipeline to Hungary via Turkey and the Balkins.124 Second, 
Gazprom signed a deal with the Austrian-led OMV, which 
would allow Gazprom to have control over gas delivered to 
Austria through the Nabucco pipeline.125  
The combination of (1) incentives for gas companies 
(OMV and MOL) to leave Nabucco for more lucrative 
contracts, and (2) the main transit supplier (Azerbaijan’s 
state-owned gas company) backing out due to its close 
proximity to and fear of upsetting its relationship with 
Russia, led to the cancellation of the Nabucco pipeline in 
July 2013. At this point, it appeared as though Russia had 
won a double victory over the EU through its bilateral 
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agreements as (1) the EU’s only pipeline project had failed, 
and (2) it secured Russia’s South Stream project. South 
Stream would effectively be controlled by Russia, with 50% 
of the project owned by Gazprom, 20% by Italian state-
owned ENI, 15% for France’s state-owned EDF, and 15% for 
Germany’s Wintershall.126 Further, each of the incorporated 
joint contracts to the project gave Gazprom at least 50% 
ownership.127 The project would have furthered Russia’s 
securitization of the EU energy market; however, since the 
onset of the construction in 2012, the EU in Brussels has 
opposed the project on the basis that South Stream’s 
construction is in direct violation of several EU laws and 
regulations, including the Third Energy Package.128  
 
B. THE BATTLE OF SOUTH STREAM  
 
The legal battle in the ensuing EU-Russian pipeline 
relationship and conflicting institutionalist versus realist 
approach came head-to-head in the recent negotiations for 
                                                
	
	
126 Why Putin pulled the plug on South Stream, RT (Dec. 3, 2014), 
http://rt.com/business/211023-eu-south-stream-putin/.  
127 See South Stream, GAZPROM, 
http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/sout
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would increase EU dependence on gas from Russia. 
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South Stream. The EU’s response to Russia’s individual 
attacks on Nabucco (including possible reasons for creating 
the anti-competition laws in the energy sector) was staunch 
opposition to South Stream on the basis that it competed 
against Nabucco and ran contrary to the EU anti-
competition laws and regulations. Russia’s intention with 
South Stream was to further capitalize on the EU market 
through Gazprom’s 50% stake in each of the pipelines, 
maintain its ownership of the pipeline and gas travelling 
through it, and limit the pipeline access to transport only 
Russian gas, rather than leave the pipeline open for third 
party access.129 This runs contrary to the Third Energy 
Package’s requirements that a company cannot own more 
than 50%, cannot own both the pipeline and the gas passing 
through it, and must abide by the registration requirements 
for third parties. 
Beginning in 2013, the EU opposition to South Stream 
had seemingly halted the project, as the EU Commission 
stated the bilateral agreements for South Stream favored 
Gazprom, and were in breach of EU Law.130 The EU 
Commission sought to stop the project through enforcing its 
laws, ultimately testing the EU’s ability to institutionalize 
the energy market under its own rules. The Commission 
                                                
	
	
129 Russia’s strategy to gain a monopoly over the South Stream supply 
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sent requests to Bulgaria, Serbia, and other contracting 
parties to cease work on the pipeline until the contracts were 
renegotiated because they were in violation of EU law.131 
The Commission articulated three concerns: (1) Russia 
needed to observe the ownership unbundling rules, meaning 
Gazprom could not own the production and the 
transmission network at the same time; (2) third party access 
to pipelines must be non-discriminatory; and (3) the tariff 
structures needed to be addressed.132 Despite the EU’s 
demands to renegotiate the contracts, Russia’s realist divide-
and-conquer strategy appeared to briefly succeed in the 
spring of 2014. During this time, Bulgaria passed legislation 
that freed South Stream from most EU regulations, 
especially the regulation that would have forced Gazprom to 
allow non-Russian gas to flow through the pipeline, by 
classifying South Stream as a “gas-sea” interconnector 
instead of a pipeline.133 By the summer of 2014, after 
condemning the Bulgarian legislation, the EU regained 
control and told Bulgaria to cease work until further 
investigation of EU competition laws were conducted. When 
Bulgaria refused, the EU cut off millions of Euros in regional 
development funds.134  
The legal battle ensued, and the EU appeared to have 
enough power to block the pipeline, until Russia struck 
another deal to bypass EU laws with Hungary in November 
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2014.135 The Hungarian law essentially approved building 
South Stream without EU permission by putting the pipeline 
out of EU jurisdiction. The law would allow companies to 
construct gas pipelines in Hungary even if the corporation 
does not have the license to operate it.136 Therefore, the 
decision of who could operate the pipeline would be left 
solely up to the domestic Hungarian Energy Office.137 
Hungary received a reprimand from the EU Commission, 
which demanded an explanation for plans to continue South 
Stream, while the EU also launched separate legal action 
against Hungary for its laws restricting foreign purchase of 
agricultural land.138 The battle reached its climax on 
December 1, 2014, when Putin announced during his visit to 
Turkey that it was scrapping South Stream for a pipeline 
with Turkey.139  
 
C. RUSSIA’S GAME CHANGING PLAY 
 
Just when the EU thought it had finally won a legal 
victory over Russia, Gazprom confirmed Russia’s decision to 
abandon the South Stream pipeline project on December 9, 
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2014.140 This decision left EU members and companies at a 
loss of over € 2.5 billion.141 Russia’s decision made clear that 
it does not intend to contract with the EU on Europe’s terms. 
Russia still seeks to manipulate the rules and laws that 
govern the energy market and is unwilling to take a back 
seat to the EU institutionalist rules and regulations. Thus, 
Russia’s response to the EU’s delays on the South Stream 
construction and increased sanctions against Russia for its 
actions in Ukraine was to work with Turkey to build a 
pipeline on Russian terms. Such a decision is clearly 
intentional as Turkey was the original transit state picked for 
the EU’s Nabucco pipeline that Russia effectively 
undermined through separate bilateral agreements.  
The new pipeline would effectively circumvent any 
Third Energy Package regulations which South Stream 
conflicted with because gas would be delivered to the EU via 
the Turkey-Greece border, cutting out any EU member state 
such as Bulgaria or the Ukraine. The Gazprom chief stated 
that once the new Turkey pipeline becomes operational, “the 
role of Ukraine as a transit country will be reduced to 
zero.”142 Thus, Russia’s new project aims to demonstrate that 
it does not plan to conform to the EU’s Third Energy 
Package, nor blink at the sanctions the EU placed on Russia 
for its activity in Ukraine. As a result, the EU again remains 
vulnerable until it can acquire alternative gas access and 
Russia’s full strategy becomes clear from its new plans. If 
Russia can’t set the rules directly, Russia will take its ball 
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back and go home; as illustrated by Russia’s scrapping of 
South Stream. Meanwhile, Russia will continue finding 
loopholes in EU laws and regulations to achieve its own 
end-goals (securitizing the energy market) until Putin can 
position Russia to become the umpire in the energy market. 
Scrapping South Stream in favor of a Turkish pipeline is just 
another strategic move by Russia to change one of its pawns 
into another queen to appear stronger on the energy market 
chessboard against what will be a lengthy game with the EU. 
 
D. RUSSIA’S OTHER PROJECT: ANTI-FRACKING   
 
2014 was a big year for Russia. In addition to the legal 
battle with the EU over South Stream, a battle over shale gas 
was playing out in the background between Russia and 
Chevron. The American energy giant Chevron showed up in 
Romania in 2013 to lease land for exploratory shale gas 
drilling.143 The development of any shale gas or U.S. entry 
into the European gas market would marginalize Russia’s oil 
and gas prices that fund Kremlin Co., especially in countries 
that are highly dependent on Russian gas.  
Romania, one of these heavily dependent countries, 
thought it had struck rich with Chevron’s plan to look for 
shale gas, but the region quickly and mysteriously became 
loud with anti-fracking144 protests, of which the Russian 
government is believed to be spearheading. There has been 
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no substantial evidence of Russian involvement in the anti-
fracking protests, but it is important to note that while anti-
fracking protests developed in all of Russia’s near abroad 
countries that are dependent on Russian oil,145 no protests 
have resulted from Gazprom’s own exploration of shale gas 
and oil. Additionally, Russian broadcasters were especially 
interested in covering the anti-fracking protests, instilling 
fear in the villagers watching in Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Ukraine, that they, “along with their crops and animals, 
would perish from poisoned water,” if shale exploration 
expanded in their regions.146 Russia seemingly won another 
victory against the EU through its divide-and-rule strategy, 
nipping regional shale gas projects in Europe in the bud by 
pitting the populations of eastern European states against 
European development of the shale gas market.  
 
E. LOOKING EAST  
 
One other pipeline looms in the discussion of future 
EU-Russian energy market competition: the Power of Siberia 
Pipeline. In May of 2014, just after Russia sent its complaint 
to the WTO regarding the EU’s prejudicial Third Energy 
Package, Russia struck a large deal with China for a 30-year, 
$400 billion dollar gas supply contract.147 Potential reasons 
for the timing and selected partner for the project include the 
EU sanctions on Russia’s energy market and Russia’s need 
for a second large energy market to diversify its own 
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supplies.148 The gas deal did not have the most favorable 
terms as China’s president drove a hard bargain on the 
prices of gas supplied by the pipeline. This could be due to 
Russia’s vulnerability from a combination of EU sanctions, 
falling gas prices, and a simultaneous drop in the Russian 
ruble. The more likely answer is that this is another 
geostrategic move by Putin to secure Russia’s long-term 
energy market consumers before new developers hit the 
scene, including shale gas operations.  
Additionally, in November 2014, Russia and China 
signed a second pipeline deal, slightly smaller than the 
initial agreement, which would supply gas from western 
Siberia to China.149 Russia, looking east, has turned its 
attention towards China with two large gas deals to supply 
almost one fifth of China’s total supply.150 This, in 
combination with the Turkish pipeline in the works, plays 
into Russia’s geostrategic pivot towards Asia. As a result, 
Russian dependence on China will increase astronomically 
in the next few years, but this may all be part of Russia’s 
geostrategic plan. While Russia will remain dependent upon 
China for now, because China is one of the few countries of 
the world with the “financial ability and the market capacity 
to consume Russia’s huge energy exports on a sustainable 
basis over a long period of time,” it will enable Russia to 
prove to the EU that the sanctions will not isolate Russia or 
bring Russia under its institution’s rules.151 Such economic 
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reliance will allow Russia to maintain a stake in the energy 
market. It is unclear whether the deals with China are a 
strength or weakness due to the dropping prices of gas and 
oil this past year. However, for purposes of EU-Russian 
relations in the energy market, Russia’s turn towards 
Eurasia will continue to increase competition between the 
two and likely hinder future negotiations with the EU 
anytime soon to soften the Third Energy Package regulations 
or sanctions against Russia’s ventures in Crimea. 
 
IV. A FUTURE RUSSIAN MONOPOLY? 
 
The EU-Russian race for energy market security in 
Europe entails several moving pieces. How the pieces fall 
will shape the legal framework and parameters in which the 
EU and Russia can contract in the energy market in the 
future, if at all. Currently, EU-Russian relations hang by a 
thread as the EU Institutionalist-oriented and Russian 
Realist-oriented states battle over regional versus national 
laws prevailing in the energy sphere, particularly concerning 
the legality of the EU’s Third Energy Package. Despite 
Russia’s recent actions shifting its attention away from 
Europe, it has not taken its eyes off the prize: a monopoly of 
the energy market in its near abroad, spanning from 
Western Europe to Eurasia. Similarly, the EU has not given 
up hopes for gaining energy security for its member states. 
This section briefly discusses the current status of the EU 
and Russia respectively, considers their current legal 
oblations to each other, and then makes concluding remarks, 
including a prediction and recommendation for future 
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A. WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE THE EU?  
 
The scrapped South Stream project has left the EU 
still dependent on Russian gas moving from Russia through 
Ukraine and the Nord Stream pipeline to Germany. 
However, the EU is not as vulnerable as it was when the 
2009 Ukraine gas crisis occurred. The EU has taken the 
necessary legal measures to ensure that each member retains 
natural gas reserves in abundance so that any immediate 
shut off by Russia will not affect the EU members 
immediately or harshly.152 Additionally, the EU has gained 
confidence from its showdown with Russia over ceasing 
construction of the South Stream pipeline until Russia 
conforms to EU laws: keeping member states from working 
on the project despite Russian attempts to undermine the 
Third Energy Package and the EU successfully sanctioning 
Russia for its illegal annexation of Crimea.  
The EU also has other plans in the aftermath of the 
scrapped South Stream pipeline, specifically a smaller 
pipeline called TANAP.153 While it does not help the 
countries that suffered as a result of the scrapped South 
Stream like Hungary and Bulgaria, TANAP will offset some 
of the EU’s dependence on Russian gas in the future.154 
Despite plans to create new pipelines, the EU’s main focus 
will be promoting “interconnectors” to ensure gas and 
electricity flow between countries. This is a chance for the 
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EU to make progress on the interconnectedness of EU 
member states, which had been lagging behind EU timeline 
goals, mainly due to Russian influences. The EU will not 
have a problem funding new energy projects and greener 
alternatives; the problem the EU faces is time.155 Lastly, the 
EU, as of January 15, 2015, has been considering whether to 
prosecute Gazprom for abusing the EU’s single energy 
market rules by forming bilateral agreements with its 
member states.156 It appears that the EU has not been broken 
by Russia’s scrapping of South Stream, but has instead 
found strength to reunify the union to fight new legal battles 
with Russia.  
 
B. IS RUSSIA AT A POINT OF STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS NOW?  
 
More light will be shed on Russia’s position in the 
energy market after the decisions are made concerning the 
Third Energy Package from the WTO and if any softening of 
relations after Crimea occur. The decision by President Putin 
to scrap the South Stream project and turn to Turkey has 
raised a lot of questions about the ultimate Russian strategy. 
The EU claims Russia’s decision was a sign of weakness 
while its economy suffers; however, Russia has portrayed 
the decision to cease construction of the pipeline as a failure 
of the EU to cooperate in negotiations, leading to the EU’s 
own economic blunder.  
The problem is that Russia cannot completely turn its 
back on the EU, its largest energy export market and import 
market for energy technologies. However, how far is too far? 
The development of the new pipelines with Turkey and 
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China, if they ever pan out, would provide Russia with a 
second energy market, free from EU regulations. If South 
Stream is ever revisited, the Turkish pipeline is completed, 
and the energy agreements with China come to fruition, 
Russia could be headed for the gas monopoly across Europe 
that it has wanted all along. However, such success, if 
possible, is far down the road, and Russia’s main concern 
will be securing an energy market so that it can continue its 
expensive foreign policy to control Ukraine and form an 
energy alliance with NATO member, Turkey. Now, more 
than ever, Russia’s fate will depend on its ability to 
securitize a stable flow from the energy market to fulfill its 
goals under the Putin regime.  
 
C. THE CONTINUED RELATIONSHIP: NECESSARY 
INTERACTION UNDER THE ECT 
 
The ECT forces Russia and the EU to maintain 
relations until 2029, meaning that Russia can be held 
accountable if it goes too far in its divide-and-rule strategy, 
pulling a similar stunt like the YUKOS expropriation against 
investors from other EU member states. The end of 2029 will 
be a decisive year if Russia has managed to hold on to or 
strengthen its position in the energy market. It is unclear 
how Russia will behave when its contract under the ECT 
expires. In order to “level the playing field between energy 
producers (for instance, Russia) and consumers (for instance, 
the EU), it is essential to minimize the perception of the ECT 
as being biased towards consuming States.”157 Further, if the 
EU is to have any chance to create the framework for the 
energy market under the ECT, it is in the EU’s best interest 
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to recognize Russia’s major role in the modernization of the 
ECT before going into negotiations with Russia. Russia’s role 
in the draft Convention on Ensuring International Energy 
Security (an attempt to modernize the ECT), and Russia’s 
determinative role in the development of arbitration158 in the 
energy field, make clear that Russia wants an equal seat at 
the table on the ECT.159  Such a strategy by the EU could 
contribute “toward the creation of a genuine level playing 
field between producing and consuming countries within 
the framework of the ECT.”160 At the same time, the EU 
needs to be cautious in its negotiating process with Russia, 
as indicated by Russia’s divide-and-rule strategy that 
undermined EU institutionalized energy rules and Russia’s 
expropriation of YUKOS.  
 
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Russia’s actions with South Stream epitomize the 
Russian divide-and-conquer strategy, using behind-the-
scene bilateral deals to create disunity, while simultaneously 
using the laws and institutions set up by the EU against it. In 
response, the EU will continue to use the available legal 
institutions and rules to beat Russia’s economy down and 
isolate Russia’s energy market. One thing remains clear: the 
battle for gas markets is far from over, as is the EU-Russian 
interaction. So long as Russia has the ability to fund its 
operations in the near abroad or maintain the appearance 
that it has the financial wherewithal to achieve its goals, the 
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EU will struggle to secure its own energy market. Russia’s 
Realist perspective will prevent the co-existence of the EU 
and Russia in the energy sector. Meanwhile, the EU will not 
allow Russia to trample on or change the rules set up by its 
institutions. The incompatible frameworks the EU and 
Russia operate under have led to further estranging of their 
abilities to contract in the energy market.  
The EU cannot beat Russia by continuing to isolate 
Russia and further weaken Russia’s position in the energy 
sector. It will need to greet Russia as an equal partner at the 
negotiation table if it hopes to peaceably form a unified 
energy market that includes Russia. Conversely, Russia’s 
view of victory leaves room for only one country to be on 
top: either Russia will effectively create a European gas 
monopoly or Russia will bring the EU under its energy 
umbrella. If Russia is unable to secure its market access 
within a reasonable time span, history will repeat itself and 
Russia’s gas control will implode, leaving the EU with an 
opportunity to rule the energy market. Neither scenario is 
likely to happen in the near future.  
Russia and the EU will continue to fight for striking 
rich pipeline deals over the next decade, but they will likely 
be geared towards different energy markets: Russia looking 
to Eurasia, while the EU returns its gaze to alternative 
energy supplies and the Middle East. Despite these 
diverging directions, both the EU and Russia will continue 
to “check” each other in the energy market. The EU will 
resume its pursuit of a uniform energy market across 
Europe. Russia will continue securing more pipelines for 
itself while simultaneously undermining rules of the EU 
institutions to ensure that a unified European gas market is 
never established unless Russia and its state conglomerate, 
Gazprom, play a leading role in its creation.  
 
